FACT OR FICTION: FLAWED APPROACHES TO
EVALUATING MARKET BEHAVIOR IN
SECURITIES LITIGATION
Ann M. Lipton*
Courts entertaining class actions brought under Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act are required to make numerous factual judgments about the economic
effects of the alleged misconduct. For example, they must determine whether and for
how long publicly-available information has exerted an influence on security prices, and
whether an alleged fraud caused economic harm to investors. Judgments on these matters
dictate whether cases will proceed to summary judgment and trial, whether classes will
be certified and the scope of such classes, and the damages that investors are entitled to
collect.
Over the years, courts have developed a variety of common law doctrines to
guide these inquiries. As this Essay will demonstrate, collectively, these doctrines operate
in such an artificial manner that they no longer shed light on the underlying factual
inquiry, namely, the actual effect of the alleged fraud on investors. The result is that
determinations of market impact and investor loss have become, in a real sense, fictional:
the size and effects of the fraud, instead, are determined based on abstract doctrine
rather than any empirical assessment of market behavior. Ultimately, these stylized
approaches to assessing market evidence interfere with the ability of the Section 10(b)
cause of action to fulfill its modern function as a mechanism for deterring fraud.
This Essay therefore recommends that, to the extent possible, these inquiries
should be replaced with alternative schemes that award damages based on some
combination of statutory formulas and evidence of investors’ reliance on the fraud.
These alternatives would be easier for courts to administer, and would re-align the fraudon-the-market action with its fundamental goals.
I.

INTRODUCTION

When courts recognized the fraud-on-the-market doctrine as a
mechanism for bringing claims under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act,
they changed the nature of the tort. Once, Section 10(b) lawsuits were
rooted in interference with the plaintiff ’s decisional autonomy; today, they
proscribe what can best be described as the wrongful causation of
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economic harm.1 That transformation was perhaps necessary to protect
the integrity of securities markets,2 but at every stage of the process, this
new type of claim requires that courts interpret market phenomena often
too complex even for financial economists to explain.3 The evidence, after
decades of litigation, is in: courts are not capable of performing these
tasks. And, perhaps in recognition of their own limitations, courts have
created a body of caselaw that permits them to avoid doing so. Instead,
they rely on a series of doctrinal shortcuts and principles that, collectively,
construct a kind of Potemkin-market that becomes the focus of judicial
decision-making. Judgments about materiality, causation, and damage are
predicated on this fictional construct that, while perhaps simpler to
evaluate, bears little resemblance to the real markets in which frauds take
place. The result is a near complete divorce of what is deemed a
cognizable harm for the purposes of Section 10(b) from the actual harm
that fraud inflicts.
So long as this state of affairs persists, Section 10(b) litigation
cannot serve any justifiable social purpose. Securities class actions are
rarely defended as compensatory devices,4 but to the extent that remains
one of their functions, it is undermined by inaccurate calculations of
damage. And to the extent deterrence is the goal, that too is ineffective,
because defendants are not held liable for anything approximating the true
harms they inflict. This is not to say that damages for securities fraud are
systematically too high, or that they overestimate the social costs of
fraud—all arguments that have been explored elsewhere in depth.5 My
argument is that even within the confines of the action as it is defined,
market evidence is misused or ignored to the point where it is impossible
to tell whether damages are too high or too low; they are simply
disconnected from reality.

John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Fraud-on-the-Market Tort, 66 VAND. L.
REV. 1755, 1782 (2013); Hillary A. Sale & Robert B. Thompson, Market Intermediation,
Publicness, and Securities Class Actions, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 487, 541–42 (2015).
1

2

Sale & Thompson, supra note 1, at 537–39.

My discussion will mainly be limited to claims involving common stock, as other kinds
of securities may have unique idiosyncrasies. See, e.g., Michael Hartzmark et al., Fraud on
the Market: Analysis of the Efficiency of the Corporate Bond Market, 2011 COLUM. BUS. L. REV.
654, 712–15; Michael L. Hartzmark & H. Nejat Seyhun, Understanding the Efficiency of the
Market for Preferred Stock, 8 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 149, 160-73 (2014).
3

But see Elliott J. Weiss, The Lead Plaintiff Provisions of the PSLRA After a Decade, or “Look
What’s Happened to My Baby,” 61 VAND. L. REV. 543, 558-59 (2008).
4

See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Capping Damages for Open-Market Securities Fraud, 38 ARIZ.
L. REV. 639 (1996); Adam Pritchard, Halliburton II: A Loser’s History, 10 DUKE J. CONST.
L. & PUB. POL'Y 27 (2015).
5

2019]

FACT OF FICTION

743

For that reason, I recommend that fraud-on-the-market actions be
given a serious makeover. I believe that these actions have an important
role to play in policing securities markets, but, as I demonstrate below,
their evidentiary demands are too high. I therefore recommend that
matters be simplified with statutory fines and other changes that will
alleviate the burdens currently placed on courts and litigants, and allow
Congress to tailor the remedy to the policy goals that the cause of action
is intended to advance.
II.

SECTION 10(B) AND FRAUD-ON-THE-MARKET

The federal securities laws and implementing regulations contain
several prohibitions on fraud and misrepresentation,6 the broadest of
which is Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act.7 That statute
prohibits the use of “any manipulative or deceptive device” in connection
with the purchase or sale of a security. It applies to all domestic securities
transactions,8 and, though it does not say so expressly, provides a private
right of action to defrauded investors.
A private plaintiff bringing a claim under Section 10(b) must
prove: (1) a materially manipulative or deceptive act (typically a statement);
(2) in connection with a securities transaction; (3) on which the plaintiff
relied; (4) accomplished with scienter; (5) economic losses; (6) caused by
the fraudulent action (“loss causation”).9 In a traditional, face-to-face
fraud action, these elements are relatively straightforward. The plaintiff
will offer evidence that he or she would not have invested absent the
misrepresentation, that the misrepresentation was intentionally or
recklessly made, and demonstrate that her losses were in some way
proximately caused by the fraud.10 But when the fraud occurs in the
context of a modern, impersonal market, matters are more complex.
Fraudsters may not deal directly with purchasers; instead, they may broadly
announce false information to the market, influencing the
recommendations of a variety of intermediaries—analysts, brokers,
investment bankers, reporters—who pass their analysis on to traders, who
then make investment decisions several steps removed from the original
false statement. This process dictates the ultimate market price of the

15 U.S.C. § 77k, (2018); 15 U.S.C. § 77l (2018); 15 U.S.C. § 78i (2018); 15 U.S.C. § 78r
(2018); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (2019).
6

7

15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2018).

8

Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank, 561 U.S. 247, 267 (2010).

9

Dura Pharm. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005).

Merritt Fox, Demystifying Causation in Fraud-on-the-Market Actions, 60 BUS. L. 507, 511
(2005).
10
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stock,11 distorting it for everyone who trades. Investors who transact at
these manipulated prices may experience real economic harm once the
truth comes to light, but they will have difficulty demonstrating the precise
role the false information played in their investment decision. If they
invested passively, the information will have played little role at all.
In order to ensure that these investors would have a remedy—and
that markets would not be left vulnerable to manipulation of this sort—
federal courts came to endorse the fraud-on-the-market doctrine. As
articulated by the Supreme Court in Basic Inc. v. Levinson,12 the fraud-onthe-market doctrine provides Section 10(b) plaintiffs with an alternate
route for establishing reliance when their securities transactions occur in
an “open and developed,” i.e., “efficient” securities market.13 These
plaintiffs are granted the benefit of two rebuttable evidentiary
presumptions: first that any public, material statements will have impacted
the price of the subject stock, and second, that investors transacting in
such a market rely on market price as an unbiased evaluation of
information about that stock.14 The two presumptions, together, create a
syllogism: the price is influenced by defendants’ statements, and investors
rely on that price, therefore, investors rely on the defendants’ statements.
The fraud-on-the-market presumptions free investors from the
burden of proving reliance on an individualized basis, and, because they
smooth out the most significant differences among class members, the
presumptions also facilitate the aggregation of claims into a single class
action. But the presumptions also substantively change the nature of the
harm alleged: in a traditional fraud action, the investor alleges that the
fraud interfered with her judgment about the subject security, but in a
fraud-on-the-market action, the harm is purely economic, in the form of
overpayment for a security that the investor may very well have purchased
even absent the fraud.15 As a result, the fraud-on-the-market context
nearly eliminates any inquiry into the behavior of a specific investor.16
Instead, it requires courts to make a variety of determinations about
Asher v. Baxter, 377 F.3d 727, 731 (7th Cir. 2004); Wielgos v. Commonwealth Edison
Co., 892 F.2d 509, 516 (7th Cir. 1989).
11

12

485 U.S. 224 (1988).

13

Id. at 241-48.

14

Id. at 247.

The investor might also allege that the fraud was designed to keep stock prices low, in
which case the harm is underpayment when the investor subsequently resells. These types
of frauds are much rarer than the traditional action, in which prices are allegedly
manipulated upwards.
15

But see Gamco Investors v. Vivendi S.A., Nos. 03 Civ. 5911(SAS), 09 Civ. 7962(SAS),
2013 WL 765122 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
16
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market behavior, from assessing the impact of defendants’ statements to
identifying losses attributable to the fraud. Along the way, courts have
developed a variety of doctrines—sometimes called “heuristics” in the
literature—to guide these inquiries. 17 As I will demonstrate, these
doctrines often have only the most tenuous connection to the underlying
market behavior they purport to interpret. The accumulation of these
doctrinal fictions has distorted the fraud-on-the-market cause of action to
the point where it no longer offers even an approximation of the harms
wrought by securities fraud.
A. Materiality
According to the Supreme Court, a fact is material if there is a
“substantial likelihood” that it “would have been viewed by the reasonable
investor as having significantly altered the total mix of information made
available.”18 Materiality is an element in every Section 10(b) action and,
theoretically, is rooted in an objective understanding of a hypothetical
“reasonable investor” whose qualities are uniform across investing
contexts.19 In fact, as has been frequently observed, the market consists
of many types of investors, from ordinary persons consuming news
reports to sophisticated institutions relying on trading algorithms.20 When
faced with claims outside of the fraud-on-the-market context, courts
frequently—if surreptitiously—take these contexts into account, tailoring
their assessments of materiality to match the investors’ circumstances.21
In fraud-on-the-market cases, however, there is no single investor,
or investor-archetype, for courts to consider. Courts fill the void by
referencing a hypothetical investor, often sophisticated and professional,
on the theory that it is the behavior of these investors that drives market
pricing.22 This notional investor is then deployed by courts to decide—
Stephen M. Bainbridge & G. Mitu Gulati, How Do Judges Maximize? (The Same Way
Everybody Else Does—Boundedly): Rules of Thumb in Securities Fraud Opinions, 51 EMORY L.J.
83, 84–85 (2002); Hillary A. Sale, Judging Heuristics, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 903, 906 (2002).
17

18

Basic, 485 U.S. at 231–32 (quotations omitted).

19

Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds, 568 U.S. 455, 467 (2013).

Tom C.W. Lin, The New Investor, 60 UCLA L. REV. 678 (2013); Yesha Yadav, How
Algorithmic Trading
20

Undermines Efficiency in Capital Markets, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1607 (2015).
See Margaret V. Sachs, Materiality and Social Change: The Case for Replacing “the Reasonable
Investor” with “the Least Sophisticated Investor” in Inefficient Markets, 81 TUL. L. REV. 473, 481
(2006); see also Flannery v. SEC, 810 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2015) (examining what institutional
investors consider when purchasing esoteric securities); U.S. v. Litvak, 808 F.3d 160 (2d
Cir. 2015) (holding jury may consider evidence of same).
21

See Asher v. Baxter, 377 F.3d 727, 731 (7th Cir. 2004); Wielgos v. Commonwealth
Edison Co., 892 F.2d 509, 515 (7th Cir. 1989); see also Stefan J. Padfield, Who Should do the
22
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frequently on the pleadings, prior to discovery and without expert
analysis—that particular facts or statements are immaterial as a matter of
law, and thus incapable of influencing market prices.23
For example, courts frequently declare that certain vague,
hyperbolic, or generic statements amount to “puffery,” such that they
contain “no useful information upon which a reasonable investor would
base a decision to invest.”24 Courts are not only famously inconsistent in
how the puffery doctrine is applied,25 but they also tend to assume a level
of rationality in market functioning that is rarely in evidence.26 Among
Math? Materiality Issues in Disclosures that Require Investors to Calculate the Bottom Line, 34 PEPP.
L. REV. 927, 939-40 (2007).
The Supreme Court has held that materiality determinations are usually matters for a
jury, TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 450 (1976), but the materiality-based
dismissals at the pleading stage remain common. See, e.g., David A. Hoffman, The “Duty”
to Be a Rational Shareholder, 90 MINN. L. REV. 537, 542 (2006).
23

Parnes v. Gateway 2000, 122 F.3d 539, 547 (8th Cir. 1997) (quoting Searls v. Glasser,
64 F.3d 1061, 1066 (7th Cir. 1995).
24

Stefan J. Padfield, Immaterial Lies: Condoning Deceit in the Name of Securities Regulation, 61
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 143, 165 (2010), and David A. Hoffman, The Best Puffery Article Ever,
91 IOWA L. REV. 1395, 1403-04 (2006). Compare the following examples of statements
found not to be puffery: Richman v. Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., 868 F. Supp. 2d 261,
277 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“Our clients’ interests always come first. Our experience shows that
if we serve our clients well, our own success will follow.”’ “Integrity and honesty are at
the heart of our business.” “Our reputation is one of our most important assets.”); Lapin
v. Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., 506 F. Supp. 2d 221 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“integrity and
honesty are at the heart of our business”); In re MidAtlantic S’holder Litig., 758 F. Supp.
226, 232 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (bank had “an excellent record of credit quality” and had
“adher[ed] to stringent credit criteria”); In re Marsh & Mclennan Companies, Inc.
Securities Litigation, 501 F. Supp. 2d 452, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“Marsh provides value to
clients by developing the most cost-effective responses to the risks they face”); Serabian
v. Amoskeag Bank Shares, Inc., 24 F.3d 357, 364 (1st Cir. 1994) (company practice was
to “address issues in a timely and conservative manner” and company “worked from very
conservative assumptions”) to those that were found to be puffery: Boca Raton
Firefighters & Police Pension Fund v. Bahash, 506 Fed. Appx. 32 (2d Cir. 2012) (company
engaged in “transparent and independent decision-making” to produce “independent
and objective analysis,”); Lloyd v. CVB Financial Corp., 2012 WL 12883517, at *3 (C.D.
Cal. 2012) (“[t]he overall credit quality of the loan portfolio is sound”; “strong credit
culture and underwriting integrity remain paramount”); ECA & Local 134 IBEW Joint
Pension Trust v. JP Morgan Chase Co., 553 F.3d 187, 205 (2d Cir. 2009) (company
employs “risk management processes [that] are highly disciplined and designed to
preserve the integrity of the risk management process”); City of Monroe Employees
Retirement System v. Bridgestone Corp., 399 F.3d 651, 670 (6th Cir. 2005) (“rigorous
testing under diverse conditions at our proving grounds around the world helps ensure
reliable quality for original equipment customers”).
25

Bainbridge & Gulati, supra note 17, at 120 (“[O]ur review of opinions invoking the
puffery doctrine found little, if any, evidence that judges were looking to the financial
economics literature as a basis for their assumptions.”).
26
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other things, despite courts’ insistence that sophisticated traders are above
such trivialities, numerous studies have documented the relevance of
managerial “tone” to investors27; as one pair of scholars put it,
“[a]necdotally, it does not take much time watching investment programs
on television to notice that even quite vague statements of optimism by
corporate managers are considered important by the investment news
media.”28
Nonetheless, in a striking demonstration of courts’
imperviousness to evidence on this issue, the Ninth Circuit went so far as
to declare that statements deemed “puffery” by courts are inactionable
even if plaintiffs can demonstrate their influence on the market.29
I have previously argued that these decisions may not reflect
judges’ factual determinations regarding market behavior so much as
policy judgments regarding the appropriate scope of the federal securities
laws.30 That said, the doctrine remains messy and unbounded, and it is
impossible to tell how much is grounded in a considered attempt to cabin
the scope of Section 10(b) versus a romanticized view of investor
behavior.
Next, taking to heart Basic’s admonition that “too low a standard
of materiality . . . might bring an overabundance of information within its
reach, and lead management simply to bury the shareholders in an
See, e.g., Paul A. Borochin et al., The effects of conference call tones on market perceptions of
value uncertainty, 40 J. FIN. MARKETS 75 (2018); Angela K. Davis et al., The effect of managerspecific optimism on the tone of earnings conference calls, 20 REV. ACCT. STUD. 639 (2015); Angela
K. Davis, Beyond the Numbers: Measuring the Information Content of Earnings Press Release
Language, 29 CONTEM. ACCT. RES. 845 (2012); James S. Doran et al., Earnings Conference
Call Content and Stock Price: The Case of REITs, 45 J. REAL ESTAT. FIN. & ECON. 402 (2012);
Ronen Feldman et al., Management’s Tone Change, Post Earnings Announcement tone change, post
earnings announcement rift and Accruals, 15 REV. ACCOUNTING STUDIES 915 (2010); Stefan J.
Padfield, Is Puffery Material to Investors? Maybe We Should Ask Them, 10 U. PA. J. BUS. & EMP.
L. 339 (2008); S.S. McKay Price et al., Earnings conference calls and stock returns: The incremental
informativeness of textual tone, 36 J. BANKING & FIN. 992 (2012); Frank Partnoy, What Your
Boss Could Learn by Reading the Whole Company’s Emails, THE ATLANTIC, Sept. 2018 (“Text
analytics has become especially popular in finance. Investment banks and hedge funds
scour public filings, corporate press releases, and statements by executives to find slight
changes in language that might indicate whether a company’s stock price is likely to go
up or down; Goldman Sachs calls this kind of natural-language processing ‘a critical tool
for tomorrow’s investors.’”); Robin Wigglesworth, The rise of ‘quantamental’ investing: where
man and machine meet, Fin. Times, Nov. 20, 2018 (“JPMorgan Asset Management’s data
scientists are creating an alert system that will ping its portfolio managers whenever
transcripts are particularly positive or negative, and voice analytics that mean they can
even detect worrying signals in someone’s intonation.”).
27

28

Bainbridge & Gulati, supra note 17, at 120.

29

Police Ret. Sys. v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 759 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2014).

30

See Ann M. Lipton, Reviving Reliance, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 91, 113 (2017).
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avalanche of trivial information,”31 courts often declare that some matters
are too inconsequential to concern reasonable investors.32 As with puffery,
these judgments may be made despite explicit market evidence to the
contrary,33 and more generally, are difficult to reconcile with findings that
such banal matters as a CFO’s golfing habits34 or a CEO’s use of the
company jet35 are relevant to assessing a corporation’s financial condition.
In a world where trading is frequently accomplished via high speed
computers synthesizing vast quantities of data, few details can reliably be
identified as beyond a reasonable investor’s interest, yet courts continue to
pass judgment as a matter of law, unmoored from any empirical
assessment of market behavior.
Finally, the “truth-on-the-market” doctrine features what are
perhaps courts’ boldest armchair pronouncements about materiality. That
doctrine holds that if fraudulent information is presumed to influence
stock prices, truthful information may be presumed to do so as well,
sometimes to the point of completely offsetting the original, false
information.36 As the Eleventh Circuit put it, a plaintiff who relies on the
fraud-on-the-market doctrine “must take the bitter with the sweet.”37
The truth-on-the-market doctrine arises in many guises.
Sometimes, it is used to establish that any misstatements were immaterial
from inception because the truth was available to investors via other
channels. Other times, the truth may be revealed at a later date, to little
obvious market reaction, and courts interpret the lack of price movement
to mean either that the original misstatement was immaterial, or that—as
discussed more below—it was not responsible for investors’ losses.38
31

Basic, 485 U.S. at 231.

32

See Bainbridge & Gulati, supra note 17, at 125-26; Hoffman, supra note 23, at 573.

See Greenhouse v. MCG Capital Corp., 392 F.3d 650 (4th Cir. 2004) (concluding an
executive’s lie about his resume was immaterial despite the dramatic stock price reaction
that followed disclosure of the truth).
33

Lee Biggerstaff et al., Chipping Away at Financial Reporting Quality (Aug. 1, 2016),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2687313.
34

David Yermack, Flights of Fancy: Corporate Jets, CEO perquisites, and inferior shareholder
returns, 80 J. FIN. ECON. 211 (2005).
35

36

Ganino v. Citizens Utils. Co., 228 F.3d 154, 167 (2d Cir. 2000).

37

Meyer v. Greene, 710 F.3d 1189, 1199 (11th Cir. 2013).

The Second Circuit recently held that the “truth-on-the-market” designation should
only be applied to arguments that the truth was available at the outset of the fraud, prior
to the plaintiffs’ purchase, see Arkansas Teachers Retirement System v. Goldman Sachs
Group, Inc., 879 F.3d 474, 485-486 (2d Cir. 2018), but did so in the curious context of a
class action—where necessarily, the “outset” of the fraud is defined in different ways for
different class members, depending on when they invested. For some plaintiffs, the
claimed truthful disclosures came after they purchased, but for others, they almost
38
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Whatever the context, depending on how clearly or accessibly the truth
was publicized, the doctrine may invite courts to make heroic assumptions
about how quickly markets can interpret and digest obscure or
disaggregated information.39 As a result, information buried in stray
sentences in long SEC filings,40 scattered across multiple court filings,41
websites,42 or public real estate records,43 reported in niche medical
journals,44 or even contained in nonpublic agency files available only via
FOIA request,45 has all been assumed by courts to have completely offset
even much more prominent falsehoods. Strikingly, courts presume the
cleansing effects of these buried disclosures even when a second, more
conspicuous, disclosure of the truth—such as a newspaper report—
triggers an obvious market response.46 The reaction to the later disclosure
would ordinarily suggest that the earlier disclosure had not fully penetrated
the market,47 but courts remain untroubled by the contradiction.
Decisions along these lines falsely imbue markets with near
mystical perfection. The more mundane reality, though, is that even
efficient markets do not process information instantaneously, and stock
prices may underreact to complex, difficult to find, or piecemeal data.48
certainly would have been available beforehand over the course of the three-year class
period. Which only demonstrates that arguments about the truth’s impact on price are
more properly viewed as variations on a single theme.
Technically, most courts agree that truth-on-the-market is only appropriate to decide
if the “corrective information must be conveyed to the public ‘with a degree of intensity
and credibility sufficient to counter-balance effectively any misleading information
created by’ the alleged misstatements, . . .”, and is almost never appropriate for
determination on a motion to dismiss. Ganino v. Citizens Utils. Co., 228 F.3d 154, 167
(2d Cir. 2000) (quoting In re Apple Computer Sec. Litig., 886 F.2d 1109, 1116 (9th Cir.
1989)). Nonetheless, as with materiality more generally, many courts engage these
arguments on the pleadings (or, as below, at class certification), often by simply avoiding
the “truth-on-the-market” label.
39

40

In re Merck & Co. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 261, 269 (3d Cir. 2005).

41

In re BofI Holding Inc. Sec. Litig., 2017 WL 5973340, *6-7 (S.D. Cal. 2017).

42

Bonanno v. Cellular Biomedicine Grp., Inc., 2016 WL 4585753, *4-5 (N.D. Cal. 2016).

43

Meyer v. Greene, 710 F.3d 1189, 1198 (11th Cir. 2013).

W. Va. Pipe Trades Health & Welfare Fund v. Medtronic, Inc., 325 F.R.D. 280, 295 (D.
Minn. 2018).
44

45

Mandalevy v. BofI Holding, Inc., 2018 WL 3032588, *14 (S.D. Cal. 2018).

46

See, e.g., Meyer, 710 F.3d 1193; Merck, 432 F.3d at 265.

47

Joshua Mitts, A Data-Driven Defense Against “Short and Distort,” N.Y.L.J. Sept. 12, 2018.

Haifeng You & Xiao-Jun Zhang, Financial Reporting Complexity and Investor Underreaction
to 10-K Information, 14 REV. ACCT. STUD. Studies 559 (2009); David A. Hirshleifer et al.,
Driven to Distraction: Extraneous Events and Underreaction to Earnings News, 64 J. FIN. 2289
2289 (2009); Lauren Cohen et al., Lazy Prices 30 (Research, Working Paper),
48
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The presumption of market impact that plaintiffs often seek by employing
the fraud-on-the-market doctrine is usually not embarrassed by
acknowledging these imperfections, as the Supreme Court recently
acknowledged.49
That said, it is also not uncommon for fraud claims to be
predicated, at least in part, on nominally public statements that were
nonetheless thinly distributed or otherwise presented in unobtrusive
fashion.50 These kinds of statements may only have an impact on the
prices of securities that trade in the most well-developed of markets,
and—as discussed more below—the fraud-on-the-market doctrine is illequipped to draw such nuanced distinctions. Given that, it is perhaps
understandable that courts tend to assume an extraordinarily high level of
efficiency across the board.51 Still, it must be recalled that these decisions
are often made on the pleadings or in the context of a motion for class
certification, without a full factual record. By doing so, courts implicitly
treat these issues as abstractions and legal principles rather than factual
inquiries. And though there are many courts that approach market
evidence with more humility,52 there are sufficient counterexamples so as
https://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Pages/item.aspx?num=50367; Hans Bonde Christensen
et al., The Real Effects of Mandated Information on Social Responsibility in Financial Reports:
Evidence from Mine-Safety Records, 64 J. ACCT. & ECON. 284 (2017); Andrew Bird et al.,
Strategic Disclosure Misclassification 1, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2778805; see also Donald C. Langevoort, Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud on the Market,
2009 WIS. L. REV. 151, 167–68, 170; James D. Cox, Understanding Causation in Private
Securities Lawsuits: Building on Amgen, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1719, 1730 (2013) (“Basic and the
fraud-on-the-market theory’s greatest failing is due to their timing in the history of
economics. Each occurred before economists fully developed important refinements and
qualifications to the efficient market hypothesis. The hypothesis’s prescriptions were
likely biased because the nature of the announcements studied were of the type that
tended to elicit a strong response (e.g., unexpected earnings, merger, or significant change
in dividends). Moreover, the early studies examined the market response to financially
significant announcements only within a brief window. Those studies did not examine
whether, over some longer period, price formation is an ongoing, rather than rapid,
process.”); Sale & Thompson, supra note 1 at 535 (“We know that the assumptions
undergirding the theory of market efficiency--complete information and rational actors-are more nuanced than some of the initial broad presentations of the theory.
Information is costly. Transaction costs exist. Noise plays a role in the markets. And,
people trade in securities for many reasons that are not rational.”).
Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2410 (2014) (describing
the Basic presumption as “modest”).
49

50

See Ann M. Lipton, Searching for Market Efficiency, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 71, 74–75 (2015).

51

See id. at 75–76.

See Ganino v. Citizens Utils. Co., 228 F.3d 154, 167 (2d Cir. 2000); In re Massey Energy
Co. Sec. Litig., 883 F. Supp. 2d 597, 617 (S.D. W. Va. 2012); Pub. Empls. Ret. Sys. of Miss.
v. Amedisys, Inc., 769 F.3d 313, 323 (5th Cir. 2014) (concluding that publicly-available
raw data—later analyzed and reported in a Wall Street Journal article—could not be
52
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to create a widening gulf between the hyper-idealized “market” as
conceived for the purposes of litigation, and the actual, real-world markets
that the parties, and the court, are purportedly investigating.
B. The Safe Harbor
In 1995, Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act (“PSLRA”)53 with the goal of deterring plaintiffs from filing meritless
“strike suits” alleging fraud based on nothing more than unfavorable or
unexpected business developments.54 Among other provisions, the
PSLRA contains a safe harbor that insulates, to some degree, management
projections of future performance from private Section 10(b) claims.
Statements covered by the safe harbor may only give rise to Section 10(b)
liability if the plaintiff establishes both that the statement was made with
actual knowledge of its falsity, and that the statement was unaccompanied
“by meaningful cautionary statements identifying important factors that
could cause actual results to differ materially. . . .”55
The safe harbor was modeled on a common law doctrine known
as “bespeaks caution.”56 That doctrine provides that “meaningful
warnings and cautionary language” may counterbalance a misleading
projection and thus render it “immaterial and thus nonactionable as
securities fraud.”57 Unlike the bespeaks caution doctrine, however,
nothing in the safe harbor requires that cautionary language completely
neutralize the allegedly-fraudulent statement in order to shield it; to the
contrary, the Conference Report accompanying the statute stated that
“[f]ailure to include the particular factor that ultimately causes the
forward-looking statement not to come true will not mean that the
statement is not protected by the safe harbor.”58
Left without any specific standard by which to evaluate cautionary
language, then, courts have tended to reward lengthy, generic risk
disclosures over warnings more tailored to the issuer’s unique

presumed to have impacted stock prices because “it is plausible that complex economic
data understandable only through expert analysis may not be readily digestible by the
marketplace”).
53

Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. 104–67, § 109 Stat. 737 (1995).

54

See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 81 (2006).

55

15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1)(A)(i).

56

Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1276 n.7 (11th Cir. 1999).

57

Harden v. Raffensperger, Hughes & Co., 65 F.3d 1392, 1404 (7th Cir. 1995).

H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-369, at 44 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 743 WL
709276.
58
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circumstances59—precisely the opposite of the types of cautions that
would mitigate the effects of any misstatements. As a result, in
application, the safe harbor grants issuers limited “license to defraud,”60 in
the sense that forward-looking statements, made with scienter, may be
immune from a shareholder lawsuit even when they are likely to influence
investors.
Standing alone, that might be viewed as simply a congressional
choice about the types of frauds that should be the subject of private,
rather than public, enforcement actions, but the safe harbor complicates
courts’ analysis of even the non-forward-looking statements that are
ostensibly outside its scope. This is because management projections are
frequently paired with, or offered in close proximity with, present or
historical representations that purportedly underlie and support the
projection. Most courts agree that these representations are not insulated
by the safe harbor,61 but that requires courts to distinguish between
“present tense” and “forward looking” in ways that may have little
meaning to market participants.62
IBEW Local 98 Pension Fund v. Best Buy Co.,63 illustrates the difficulty.
Best Buy executives issued an allegedly false projection of future
performance and then stated they were “on track to deliver and exceed . .
Richard A. Cazier et al., Are Lengthy and Boilerplate Risk Factor Disclosures Inadequate? An
Examination of Judicial and Regulatory Assessments of Risk Factor Language, KELLEY SCH. OF
BUS. RES. PAPER SERIES NO. 18–43 1, 33 (Nov. 2018) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3167611.
59

60

In re Stone & Webster, Inc., Sec. Litig., 414 F.3d 187, 212 (1st Cir. 2005).

See, e.g., In re Quality Sys. Link, Inc. Sec. Litig., 865 F.3d 1130, 1141 (9th Cir. 2017);
Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs Inc., 513 F.3d 702, 705 (7th Cir. 2008); In re Stone
& Webster, Inc., Sec. Litig., 414 F.3d 187, 213 (1st Cir. 2005).
61

For example, there is a split of authority as to whether a statement that the company
is “on track” to meet projections is forward-looking (and thus potentially subject to safeharbor protection), or not. Compare Wochos v Tesla, 2018 WL 4076437, at *5–6 (N.D.
Cal. 2018) (“on track” is forward-looking) with Dahhan v. OvaScience, Inc., 2018 WL
3637969, at *8 (D. Mass. July 31, 2018) (“on track” is not forward looking). Meanwhile,
representations such as “sales are still going strong,” Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v.
Tellabs Inc., 513 F.3d 702, 705 (7th Cir. 2008), “[We are] not anticipating any major
increase in maintenance costs or cost of oversight,” No. 84 Employer-Teamster Joint
Council Pension Trust Fund v. America West Holding Corp., 320 F.3d 920, 933 (9th Cir.
2003), and “We’re well poised to go into [the third quarter],” Capri Optics Profit Sharing
v. Digital Equip. Corp., 950 F.2d 5, 11 (1st Cir. 1991), have all been deemed to be
statements of present condition rather than future projections. In truth, it is difficult to
imagine that investors draw much distinction between a company’s representation that it
is “on track” to meet previous EPS guidance and that sales are “still going strong”; both
statements convey similar information (though perhaps with greater or lesser specificity),
namely, that present conditions are consistent with achieving expectations for the future.
62

63

818 F.3d 775 (8th Cir. 2016).
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. .” those projections on an analyst conference call a few hours later. The
stock price demonstrably reacted to the original statement, but did not
respond to the second, confirmatory statement. Later, Best Buy was
unable to meet its projections, and investors filed a lawsuit alleging that
the company had intentionally or recklessly misled the market. The district
court agreed that the plaintiffs had credibly alleged fraud, but concluded
that the projection was protected by the safe harbor due to Best Buy’s
extensive cautionary language. The second statement, however, was
deemed a description of present conditions, and was not. As a result,
plaintiffs were permitted to pursue Section 10(b) claims based on the
second statement, but not the first. 64 However, on appeal from the district
court’s decision to certify the class, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the
second statement had not had any impact on the company’s stock price.
As a result, plaintiffs could not utilize the fraud-on-the-market doctrine to
establish reliance on that statement.65
Was the Eighth Circuit correct? The plaintiffs’ expert conceded
that the second statement had not introduced additional inflation into the
stock price. And certainly, the original projection might have implicitly
carried with it the representation that the company was “on track” to meet
projections, such that the second representation added nothing new. The
Eighth Circuit suggested as much, noting that it had not been tasked with
deciding whether the “on track” statement could “meaningfully be
distinguished” from the projection. On the other hand, if the company
had not made such a statement during the conference call, the market might
have suspected something was amiss and reacted negatively.
These are distinctions that the safe harbor requires courts to draw,
but there are no tools available to draw them. Thus, once again, market
evidence is evaluated as a matter of theoretical possibility rather than
empirical reality.
C. Loss Causation
In a fraud-on-the-market action, loss causation refers to the
proximate relationship between the artificial inflation introduced into the
stock by the fraud, and the economic loss ultimately experienced by
investors.66 Like all proximate cause analyses, loss causation in the fraudon-the-market context is a hybrid mix of the factual and the prudential: it
IBEW Local 98 Pension Fund v. Best Buy Co., 958 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1077–78 (D.
Minn. 2013).
64

65

818 F.3d 775, 783.

See Dura Pharmaceuticals v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005). Loss causation was a
common law requirement for many years before Congress codified it in the PSLRA. See
15 U.S.C. §78u-4(b)(4).
66
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requires courts both to make a but-for determination as to whether the
defendant’s behavior contributed to the plaintiff ’s injury, and a policy
determination as to whether that contribution was sufficiently significant
to hold the defendant legally responsible.67 Yet here as well, courts have
invented tests and definitions that are far removed from the reality of how
markets function.
It is generally agreed that, at minimum, loss causation requires that
the economic loss be associated with the artificial inflation leaving the
stock, either in whole or in part; otherwise, the investor could recoup her
overpayment by simply reselling the stock to another investor.68 But even
though the dissipation of artificial inflation, coupled with an economic
loss, is a necessary predicate to establishing loss causation, it is not clear
that it is a sufficient one. In Dura Pharmaceuticals v. Broudo,69 the Supreme
Court directed courts to distinguish stock price drops that reflect “the
earlier misrepresentation” from those that reflect “changed economic
circumstances, changed investor expectations, new industry-specific or
firm-specific facts, conditions, or other events.”70 Given the nature of
market pricing, this cryptic phrase admits multiple interpretations.
When a company lies about its financial condition, traders use that
information to predict the corporation’s future cash flows and set an
appropriate price for the stock. As newer information bearing on future
cash flows comes to light, traders update their models and reprice the
stock accordingly. If, due to the new information, the old, fraudulent
information is rendered stale, that older information will exert less
influence over the price.71 Any resulting stock price drop might therefore
be attributed to the fraud, in the sense that more accurate information is
now exerting a greater influence over the price than the false information.
To offer a simple example, if a company projects it will sell 30,000 units,
that information will be priced into the stock; if later it reports that it only
sold 10,000 units, the market will adjust to reflect the newer, more relevant
See Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339 (1928); see also Sale & Thompson, supra
note 1, at 498 (“Loss causation responds to the legal and policy concerns that the
plaintiffs should not be insured against market changes. This element plays the
intervening or proximate cause role that the Palsgraf case plays in traditional tort cases”);
Jill E. Fisch, Cause for Concern: Causation and Federal Securities Fraud, 94 IOWA L. REV. 811,
830–31 (2009).
67

68

Cf. Dura, 544 U.S. at 342.

69

Id. at 343.

70

Id.

Lipton, supra note 28, at 118; Jay W. Eisenhofer et al., Securities Fraud, Stock Price
Valuation, and Loss Causation: Toward a Corporate Finance-Based Theory of Loss Causation, 59
BUS. LAW. 1419, 1442–43 (2004).
71
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information, and the old projection will no longer influence the stock’s
price.
That said, to determine whether loss causation in the legal sense
exists, courts conduct a further inquiry into the reasons why the false
information became stale. In two influential cases, the Fifth and Seventh
Circuits discussed a scenario in which a company lies about the qualities
of a particular asset, thus inflating its stock price.72 Later, for reasons
entirely unrelated to those qualities (such as an intervening accident), the
asset loses all of its value. In this situation, the courts determined, the
element of loss causation is not satisfied. Certainly, the fraud is a but-for
cause of investors’ losses: the false information—the asset’s value—no
longer contributes to the stock price, because the asset has become
worthless. And, due to the stock price drop, investors have suffered
economic losses, both in the amount they overpaid for their stock, and in
the amount that represented the asset’s true value (though the latter
portion is unrecoverable). Nonetheless, courts reason that the investor,
though misled about the qualities of the asset, took a fully informed risk
about the likelihood of its destruction via intervening event, and therefore
should bear the consequence.73
This, naturally, is a policy judgment. One might reasonably place
responsibility on the fraudster for inducing the overpayment in the first
place; nonetheless, that is not the route that courts have apparently chosen
to go.74 We can quibble over whether the line has been drawn in the right
place,75 but if it is the line, it requires courts to make two inquiries: first,
has the artificial inflation left the stock (with a resulting price drop), and
second, did it do so due to an intervening event unrelated to the fraud
itself. Too often, courts do not investigate this relationship.
Courts generally agree that if the market price drops upon
revelation that earlier statements were false—for example, upon the
See Bastian v. Petren Res. Corp., 892 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1990); Huddleston v. Herman
& MacLean, 640 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1981).
72

See Bastian, 892 F.2d at 685 (“If the defendants’ oil and gas ventures failed not because
of the [matters that were concealed] but because of industry-wide phenomena that
destroyed all or most such ventures, then the plaintiffs, given their demonstrated desire
to invest in such ventures, lost nothing by reason of the defendants’ fraud….”).
73

Prior to Dura Pharmaceuticals v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005), the Ninth Circuit took
the opposite view and placed responsibility for these losses on defendants. See Wool v.
Tandem, 818 F.2d 1433, 1442 (9th Cir. 1987). In Dura, however, the Supreme Court
rejected the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation and implicitly endorsed the Seventh’s. See Dura,
544 U.S. at 346.
74

Jill Fisch explains that this line of case law is more protective of defendants than the
common law. See Fisch, supra note 67, at 832–33.
75
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announcement of a restatement—those are losses “caused” by the fraud.
But many cases are not quite so clear cut. For example, a company may
lie about its underlying business conditions—such as its debt burden,76 or
the functionality of a new product77—and eventually, the bill comes due
when the company is forced to declare bankruptcy, or to admit to a
dramatic slowdown in sales. The company’s stock price drops, even absent
revelation that the company had earlier misrepresented its then-current
financial condition. In these cases, the losses are attributable to the
underlying problems that the fraud concealed, but the market may
belatedly—or never—explicitly recognize that it had been misled.
Faced with these sorts of fact-patterns, courts have displayed
dramatic inconsistency, generally recognizing that there is no requirement
that the defendant company explicitly confess to fraud,78 but otherwise
reaching little agreement as to how close a relationship between the fraud
and the disclosure that triggers the loss is required.79 Many circuits have
endorsed some version of the “materialization of the risk” standard,
which requires that the losses be traceable to a risk concealed by the false
statements.80 That standard is in theory similar an analysis of intervening
cause, but in application is subject to considerable variation, with courts
frequently demanding some indication that market traders began to doubt
the veracity of the defendants’ earlier statements.81

76

In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 375 F. Supp. 2d 278, 282, 306 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).

77

In re Allaire Corp. Sec. Litig., 224 F. Supp. 2d 319, 338-39 (D. Mass. 2002).

See Ohio Pub. Employees Retirement Sys. v. Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp., 830
F.3d 376 (6th Cir. 2016); Alaska Elec. Pension Fund v. Flowserve Corp., 572 F.3d 221
(5th Cir. 2009).
78

Compare Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2005) with Alaska Elec.
Pension Fund v. Flowserve Corp., 572 F.3d 221 (5th Cir. 2009).
79

Lentell, 396 F.3d at 173; see also Ohio Pub. Employees Retirement Sys. v. Fed. Home
Loan Mortgage Corp., 830 F.3d 376, 385 (6th Cir. 2016); In re Williams Sec. Litig. WCG
Subclass, 558 F.3d 1130, 1134–135 (10th Cir. 2009).
80

See, e.g., Police and Fire Ret. Sys. of City of Detroit v. SafeNet, Inc., 645 F. Supp. 2d
210, 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“The February 2, 2006, disclosure did not reveal to investors
that SafeNet’s statements about its accounting practices were false, and this disclosure
cannot serve as a foundation to plead loss causation.”). Occasionally, courts employing
the “materialization of the risk” standard adopt particularly stringent requirements for
how these risks are defined. For example, in Nguyen v. New Link Genetics Corporation, 297
F. Supp. 3d 472, 500 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), the plaintiffs alleged that defendants misled the
market about the characteristics of a drug study, and losses were incurred when the study
produced poor results. The court rejected plaintiffs’ allegations of loss causation because
the defendants “repeatedly cautioned investors about a litany of risks—the inability to
achieve the trial’s primary endpoint, obtain FDA approval, or commercialize the drug.”
But that elides the issue: the plaintiffs knew the trial was risky, what they did not know
was that it was, allegedly, misdescribed. Cf. Pommer v. Medtest, 961 F.2d 620, 624 (7th
81
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As I have discussed elsewhere,82 courts that impose such a high
barrier to establishing loss causation fail to recognize the realities of how
financial information is interpreted by the market. Once more current
information about the company’s financial condition is disclosed, traders
will no longer rely on older, outdated information to price the stock,
regardless of whether they are aware that the old information was untrue.
The only question, then, should be whether an intervening event broke
the chain of causation between the original fraud and the company’s new
status. When courts reject this reality they are, in practical effect,
demanding that specific information be made available to the market—
Cir. 1992) (“It is not enough that the other party must have recognized a risk. Risks are
ubiquitous. Disclosures assist investors in determining the magnitude of risks. Even
savvy investors may recover when a bald lie understates the gravity of a known risk.”).
The plaintiffs further alleged that these misdescribed factors led to the study’s failure.
That surely is a sufficiently tight causal chain (if proven) to justify holding defendants’
responsible for the fraud, yet the Nguyen court did not undertake this analysis.
The Nguyen court’s reasoning is not unusual; the Fourth Circuit offered a similar
interpretation of the materialization of the risk standard in Katyle v. Penn Nat’l Gaming,
Inc., 637 F.3d 462 (4th Cir. 2011). There, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant company
publicly maintained that it was pursuing a leveraged buyout even though it was privately
negotiating to terminate the agreement. Because the LBO was no longer being pursued,
the defendant company canceled scheduled meetings with state regulators, and truth
began to leak out—and cause plaintiffs’ losses—upon disclosure of the agenda changes.
The Fourth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs’ allegations of loss causation because the market
was already aware that there were significant risks that the transaction would not close.
Once again, this decision elided the actual risk to which the plaintiffs pinned their
allegations—that the approvals, and the deal, would fail, not merely because of its
inherent problems (of which the market was aware) because the defendant was no longer
actively pursuing it, despite representing to the contrary. Once again, any ordinary chain
of causation analysis would find a fairly direct relationship between the defendants’
failure to pursue the deal, and the canceled meetings (not to mention the deal’s ultimate
demise).
In both Nguyen and Katyle, one might argue that the failure would have occurred
anyway: the study may have failed for reasons unrelated to the design failures, the LBO
may have failed for reasons other than the defendants’ lack of diligence. If proven, these
intervening causes likely would break the chain of causation. But the significant point is
that neither court attempted the analysis (and likely could not have done so on the
pleadings).
Meanwhile, in circuits that have not adopted a materialization of the risk
standard, courts may explicitly require that the market become aware that prior
statements were false before the loss causation element can be met. For example, in
North Port Firefighters’ Pension v. Temple-Inland, Inc., 936 F. Supp. 2d 722 (N.D. Tex. 2013),
the defendant allegedly overstated the value of its mortgage-backed securities portfolio.
Though it eventually disclosed that the securities’ values had declined—which caused its
stock price to drop—it did not disclose that its earlier reporting had been fraudulent. As
a result, the court held that the plaintiffs failed to allege loss causation.
82

Lipton, supra note 31, at 118.
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often something akin to an explicit revelation of past falsity—that
investors themselves do not consider necessary or relevant to value the
stock. They are demanding the disclosure of immaterial information as a
condition to investors’ recovery.
Additionally, similar to the materiality inquiry, courts have
employed bright line rules to identify types of disclosures that cannot cause
cognizable Section 10(b) losses, because—in their view—they are, as a
legal matter, devoid of informational content. For example, a number of
courts have declared that announcements of investigations or lawsuits—
whether instituted by the government, or internal inquiries—cannot,
standing alone, cause losses for Section 10(b) purposes because an
investigation or a complaint is merely an allegation rather than a
confirmation of wrongdoing.83 This, of course, is a non sequitur; if a
stock price represents traders’ view of the potential cash flows of the
business, adjusted for risk,84 a credible possibility of fraud will cause them
to reassess those risks and reprice the stock accordingly. Assuming the
investigation was, in fact, caused by an underlying fraud—that is, if the
plaintiffs are able to demonstrate the other elements of a Section 10(b)
claim and show a causal chain between the investigation and the fraud
they’ve alleged—there is no reason to treat stock price drops due to market
distrust of the subject company as any less “caused” by the fraud as other
kinds of price drops. An investigation is hardly an intervening event, and
presumably, if there was fraud, and it is ultimately revealed—either with a
full admission, or simply with disclosure of the underlying financial
condition that it concealed—the stock will drop even further, to account
for the fact that what was once an uncertainty has now become definite.
At the same time, it is to be expected that even that drop will be smaller

Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys. of Miss. v. Amedisys, Inc., 769 F.3d 313, 323 (5th Cir. 2014)
(“[C]ommencement of government investigations on suspected fraud do not, standing
alone, amount to a corrective disclosure.”); see also Curry v. Yelp, 875 F.3d 1219, 1225 (9th
Cir. 2017); Meyer v. Greene, 710 F.3d 1189, 1201 (11th Cir. 2013); Magro v. FreeportMcMoran Inc., 2018 WL 3725781, *8 (D. Ariz. 2018); Martin v. GNC Holdings, 2017
WL 3974002, *18 (W.D. Pa. 2017); Sapssov v. Health Mgmt. Assocs., Inc., 22 F. Supp. 3d
1210, 1231 (M.D. Fla. 2014), aff ’d, 608 Fed. Appx. 855 (11th Cir. 2015); In re Dell, Inc.,
Sec. Litig., 591 F. Supp. 2d 877, 910 (W.D.Tex.2008) (“Nor does the disclosure of an
investigation, whether conducted internally or by the SEC, absent a revelation of prior
misrepresentations, constitute a corrective disclosure for purposes of loss causation.”).
The Sixth Circuit has grudgingly allowed that sometimes an allegation of wrongdoing
can trigger cognizable losses, at least if the company confirms the allegations, and they
are accompanied by detailed expert analysis unavailable to the general public. See Norfolk
Cty. Ret. Sys. v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., 877 F.3d 687 (6th Cir. 2017).
83

Eisenhofer supra at 1421–23; see also Pommer v. Medtest, 961 F.2d 620, 623 (7th Cir.
1992) (“Probabilities determine the value of stock.”).
84
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than it might have otherwise been, because the market’s distrust was, by
now, priced in; suspicions have simply been confirmed. 85
In a twist on the truth-on-the-market concept, courts have also
declared that information that is not “new,” or that represents a
repackaging or reinterpretation of previously-available information,
cannot trigger cognizable Section 10(b) losses.86 For the reasons described
above, these judgments may involve hypothesized market functioning that
is of dubious accuracy.87
It might be argued that these decisions simply represent stricter
policy judgments about the types of losses for which defendants should
be held responsible.88 But if that’s what courts are attempting, the
approach is deeply misguided, because no serious effort is made to focus
on the underlying chain of causation that led to the stock price drop
beyond the particular form of announcement that triggered it. Too often,
courts’ approach to loss causation focuses on what was disclosed to the
exclusion of why the disclosure was made and the events that led to its
necessity.
Indeed, if courts are making policy judgments about remote
chains of causation, they are particularly dangerous ones, because they
reward defendants for “gaming” their disclosures so as to minimize

In re Bradley Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Sec. Litig., 421 F. Supp. 2d 822 (D.N.J. 2006), where
a court accepted loss causation allegations based on the announcement of an
investigation, provides a useful example. In that case, a company’s stock price fell
dramatically upon announcement of an informal SEC inquiry. At the conclusion of the
investigation, the company was forced to restate previously reported sales, which resulted
in a slight uptick in its stock price, presumably reflecting the fact that the problems were
not quite as dire as investors had feared. A separate question—discussed further below—
is how damages should be calculated in this scenario.
85

86

See Meyer v. Greene, 710 F.3d 1189 (11th Cir. 2013).

87

See supra Part II.A.

Certainly, there are some transparently policy-based loss causation doctrines. Take, for
example, the rule that the announcement of an investigation cannot trigger cognizable
Section 10(b) losses. Courts often add a further qualification that such announcements
can trigger Section 10(b) losses if, and only if, the investigation results in a definitive
finding of fraud. See Pub. Empls. Ret. Sys. of Miss. v. Amedisys, Inc., 769 F.3d 313 (5th
Cir. 2014). This makes even less sense: a disclosure of the outcome of an investigation
at Time 2 cannot change how the market understood, and reacted to, an earlier disclosure
at Time 1. Thus, the likely explanation for these holdings is that courts fear that if the
announcement of an investigation - without a subsequent definitive revelation of
wrongdoing - qualifies as loss causation, plaintiffs will find it too easy to bring meritless
claims, simply based on a company’s own internal attempts to get its affairs in order.
What courts ignore, however, is that it is the falsity and scienter elements of a Section
10(b) claim that are meant to protect against such a scenario.
88
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market reaction and thereby defeat a subsequent Section 10(b) claim.89
One study conducted in the wake of Dura found that firms that “bundled”
disclosures of restatements with unrelated news, thereby muddying the
market signal, were not only less likely to become the targets of litigation,
but also had claims against them dismissed at higher rates, and settled for
lower amounts.90 Managers may also seek to “walk down the stock” with
unrelated negative news so as to minimize the impact of fraud-related
disclosures.91 Current approaches to loss causation do nothing to
discourage this behavior.
In sum, courts are not only inconsistent from case to case, but they
often make no effort to identify the chain of causation that led to the loss,
let alone conduct a serious policy analysis as to whether that chain should
trigger liability. Absent these inquiries, judicial pronouncements regarding
the presence or absence of the loss causation element bear little
relationship to the real-world conditions that harmed investors.
III.

CLASS CERTIFICATION

Beyond the merits inquiries that take place on a motion to dismiss
(or, less commonly, in the context of summary judgment), market
evidence plays a myriad of roles throughout the class certification process,
and therefore is as susceptible to misinterpretation and confusion in that
context as it is in the context of substantive evaluation of the plaintiffs’
claims.
As explained above, the Basic presumptions translate what would
otherwise be a series of individual questions about investors’ reliance on
the alleged fraud into a common question regarding the fraud’s effect on
the market. That transformation is what enables plaintiffs to bring their
claims as a class action.92 The class certification motion has therefore
become a critical battleground to determine how the market likely
responded to the alleged fraud.

89

Fisch, supra note 67, at 852.

See Barbara A. Bliss et al., Information Bundling and Securities Litigation, 65 J.
ACCOUNTING & ECON. 61 (2018).
90

OF

Fisch, supra note 67, at 852; see also Ann Morales Olazabal, Loss Causation in Fraud-onthe-Market Cases Post-Dura Pharmaceuticals, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L. J. 337, 367–68 (2006) (“A
number of commentators have cautioned against sanctioning a company’s ‘walking
down’ its numbers in anticipation that a fraud will be revealed, or rewarding those
companies that either can obscure their fraud with its complexity or can hide their fraud
the longest, by permitting them to escape liability for having thwarted plaintiffs on the
element of loss causation.”).
91

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(requiring that common questions predominate over
individualized ones).
92
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A. Establishing the Presumption of Price Impact
The essential observation of Basic is that pricing in organized
markets is dictated in large part by public information, and therefore false
information is likely to influence those prices. Yet not all markets—and
not all frauds—are the same. There is no such thing as a perfectly efficient
market; leaving aside the reality of human frailty, markets will only
efficiently process information to the extent that the benefits of gathering,
interpreting, and trading on new information exceed their costs.93
Efficiency is therefore a matter of degree94; securities may trade in robust
or thin markets, and respond with more or less alacrity to new
information. Exceptionally well-developed markets may respond to
(relative) minutiae, while even highly inefficient markets may nonetheless
respond to especially significant corporate events.
At the same time, not all securities fraud claims are based on
announcements of high salience. They may be predicated on boilerplate
disclosures in dense documents,95 articles and advertisements in trade
journals,96 or other materials of limited circulation. Some disclosures are
complex and difficult to process; others may be easily understood.97 A
single measure of market efficiency ill-suits all claims; the presumption of
price impact may be more or less warranted depending on the nature of
the market and the fraud alleged. In light of this reality, the fundamental
policy choice is where to place the burden of uncertainty.98
One solution would be to require plaintiffs to prove that each
fraudulent statement influenced market prices.99 Such a standard would
be highly protective of fraud defendants, because it would make plaintiffs
bear the entire burden of uncertainty. As it turns out, though, there are
few if any effective mechanisms for establishing that a statement did—or
93

Cox, supra note 48, 1731-32; Langevoort, supra note 48, at 175.

Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2410 (2014); Cox, supra
note 48, at 1733.
94

95

Lipton, supra note 30, at 74.

In re Carter-Wallace, Inc. Securities Litigation, 150 F.3d 153, 156–57 (2d Cir. 1998); City
of Roseville Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. Horizon Lines, Inc., 713 F. Supp. 2d 378 (D. Del.
2010).
96

Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Good Finance, Bad Economics: An Analysis of the
Fraud–on–the–Market Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1059, 1083–1087 (1990).
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Donald Langevoort, Judgment Day for Fraud-on-the-Market: Reflections on Amgen and the
Second Coming of Halliburton, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 37, 47 (2015).
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See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, Rethinking Basic, 69 BUS. LAW. 671 (2014);
Jonathan Macey et al., Lessons from Financial Economics: Materiality, Reliance and Extending the
Reach of Basic v. Levinson, 77 VA. L. REV. 1017 (1991).
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did not—impact prices (a point to which I will return below). If plaintiffs
bear the burden of demonstrating the effect of each statement, they will
rarely succeed, and the fraud-on-the-market cause of action will be
extremely limited.
Another solution would be to modulate plaintiffs’ entitlement to
the presumption. Plaintiffs would bear the burden of showing that the
market in which the security traded was relatively efficient for the type of
information at issue and, if they met this burden, they would be entitled to a
presumption that the specific false statements influenced stock prices.
That, however, would be a complex (if not impossible) inquiry, especially
considering that fraud claims may span numerous types of statements over
a prolonged period, and certain types of information may have greater or
lesser salience at different times.100 Understandably, then, courts have
chosen a different path: they evaluate whether a market is efficient, in
some abstract sense, and, if it is, plaintiffs are entitled to the Basic
presumptions. This entails a different policy judgment: the definition of
efficiency may be over or under inclusive, depending on whether we have
a greater fear of fraudsters who seek to manipulate securities markets, or
plaintiffs who seek to bring nuisance lawsuits.
Until recently, courts employed very demanding standards for
identifying the presence of “efficient” markets for Basic purposes,
occasionally concluding that even securities trading on the NASDAQ or
the NYSE were inefficient.101 These standards drew a considerable
amount of scholarly fire,102 because, at least in many cases, much lower
levels of efficiency would be sufficient to respond to the alleged fraud.103
For example, we can assume that even thinly-traded stocks will rapidly
react to a sudden announcement of a “government contract that will
quadruple earnings.”104 When courts engaged in what Donald Langevoort
described as “mind-numbing investigations of adjustment variations often
measured in minutes rather than weeks,” 105 they risked no-certification

For example, allegations that a company concealed sexual harassment by a high-level
executive would likely be more relevant to investors today than it would have been even
a few years ago. (Credit to Jill Fisch for the suggestion).
100

See, e.g., IBEW Local 90 Pension Fund v. Deutsche Bank AG, 2013 WL 5815472
(S.D.N.Y. 2013); In re Scor Holding (Switz.) AG Litig., 537 F. Supp. 2d 556 (S.D.N.Y.
2008).
101

102

E.g., Cox, supra note 48, at 1726; Langevoort, supra note 48, at 168–78.
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Cox, supra note 48, at 1732.
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Langevoort, supra note 48, at 172.
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decisions untethered to any policy rationale, or, at least, none that they
articulated.
In Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (“Halliburton II”),106 the
Supreme Court potentially changed the game. The Court affirmed the
framework whereby plaintiffs initially establish that the market was
efficient (and thus their entitlement to Basic’s presumptions), but relaxed
the standard, describing efficiency as a “matter of degree,” and the Basic
presumption as a “modest” one.107 Cognizant of the concern that not all
markets are efficient enough to absorb all statements, the Court handwaved the issue, explaining that “Basic’s presumption of reliance thus does
not rest on a ‘binary’ view of market efficiency. Indeed, in making the
presumption rebuttable, Basic recognized that market efficiency is a matter
of degree and accordingly made it a matter of proof.” Accordingly, the
Court held, defendants “may seek to defeat the Basic presumption [of
price impact] at [the class certification] stage through direct as well as
indirect price impact evidence.”108
The problem with this reasoning is the poor fit between the
diagnosis and the cure. It would be one thing if the Court simply decided
that it would be better to grant the presumption in cases where it is not
warranted than to deny it in cases where it is, and therefore the test of
efficiency should not be a stringent one. But instead, the Court apparently
believed it could avoid that choice altogether by first permitting plaintiffs
a presumption of price impact, and then allowing defendants to rebut that
presumption on a statement by statement basis. Yet the Court’s
framework continues to require an on/off approach to the assessment of
whether the market was efficient in the first place, without regard to
whether it was efficient for this kind of information; the Court simply shifted
the trigger point on the scale.
As we shall see, the prospect of rebuttal is not adequate to the
weight the Court placed on it. Given the limited tools available for such a
demonstration, courts have displayed extraordinary confusion over what
rebuttal means or how it is to be shown. Worse, because these
determinations are made on class certification—without consideration of
a full record—courts’ evaluations are artificially truncated. The result is
that courts conduct a series of tests and empirical assessments that,
though held up as significant, in fact have little bearing on the question of
the fraud’s effect on prices.
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134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014).
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Id. at 2410; Langevoort, Judgment Day, at 52.

108

134 S. Ct. at 2417.
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Since Halliburton II, at least some, though not all, courts have
responded to the shift in tone and adjusted their standards for evaluating
efficiency.109 Still, courts are left without any clear standard as to how
efficient is efficient enough, and none (so far) have suggested that this
initial question should be answered by reference to the type of statements
that form the basis for the claim.110
B. Rebutting the Presumption of Price Impact
After plaintiffs establish the presence of an efficient market—and
thus their entitlement to the presumption that defendants’ false statements
impacted prices—defendants have the right to rebut that presumption.
However, because it is a class certification motion and not a full-blown
trial, there are limits to the matters courts may consider. Courts cannot
consider whether the statements were material, because materiality is an
element under Section 10(b) even outside the class action context; its
presence or absence creates no individualized issues.111 Loss causation is
similarly off-limits: as the Supreme Court put it, “[t]he fact that a
subsequent loss may have been caused by factors other than the revelation
of a misrepresentation has nothing to do with whether an investor relied
on the misrepresentation in the first place, either directly or presumptively
through the fraud-on-the-market theory.”112
With both materiality and loss causation off the table, the
Halliburton II Court assumed that defendants would use econometric

Compare In re Petrobras Sec. Litig., 862 F.3d 250 (2d Cir. 2017) and In re Groupon Sec.
Litig., 2015 WL 1043321 (N.D. Ill. 2015) with OPERS v. Fed. Home Loan Mortgage
Corp., 2018 WL 3861840 (N.D. Ohio 2018) (finding evidence of efficiency insufficient
for a NYSE-traded stock, relying on pre Halliburton II standards); In re Finisar Corp. Sec.
Litig., 2017 WL 6026244 at *7 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (“An efficient market is said to digest or
impound news into the stock price in a matter of minutes”); Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v.
Halliburton Co., 309 F.R.D. 251, 269 (N.D. Tex. 2015) (same).
109

The situation is aggravated by the fact that to detect the presence of an efficient
market, courts usually look to the factors first delineated in Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp.
1264 (D.N.J. 1989) and Krogman v. Sterritt, 202 F.R.D. 467 (N.D. Tex. 2001). These factors,
however, have little basis in the empirical literature, and many are apparently duplicative
or irrelevant. See Alon Brav & J.B. Heaton, Event Studies in Securities Litigation: Low Power,
Confounding Effects, and Bias, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 583 (2015); Geoffrey Christopher Rapp,
Proving Markets Inefficient: The Variability of Federal Court Decisions on Market Efficiency on
Cammer v. Bloom and its Progeny, 10 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 303 (2002).
110

Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Ret. Plans and Trust Funds, 568 U.S. 455, 474 (2013). As
described above, this conclusion is subject to challenge given courts’ sub rosa practice of
modulating their assessment of materiality in non-fraud-on-the-market cases. See supra
Part II.A.
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Erica P. John Fund v. Halliburton Co., 563 U.S. 804, 813 (2011).
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studies to establish the lack of price impact.113 The problem here,
however, is that the Court overestimated the efficacy of the tools we have
to conduct such investigations, rendering the line between permitted price
impact inquiries, and prohibited inquiries into loss causation and
materiality, gossamer thin.
The standard mechanism for assessing whether particular
information had an effect on stock prices is known as an “event study.”
But, as numerous scholars have now documented, event studies are quite
limited and unreliable when used in the context of securities litigation.114
These studies purport to detect when a stock’s price moves in response to
news or a corporate disclosure— i.e., a particular “event,” such as the
original fraudulent statement. But when multiple pieces of news are
issued simultaneously, they cannot distinguish between news that moves
the stock and news that has no effect.115 They are also relatively insensitive,
meaning that they will only detect effects for particularly extreme stock
price reactions, and the more volatile the stock ordinarily, the less effective
the event study is likely to be.116 As a result, events that move the stock
less dramatically (or that are confounded with events that exert pressure
in the other direction) will yield a “null” result, meaning that the study will
not be able to rule out the possibility that the event had no effect on prices.
Thus, event studies cannot, even as a theoretical matter, offer very reliable
evidence that an event did not affect stock prices, which is precisely what
the Supreme Court expected they would be used to do.
Compounding the problem is that in many, if not most, cases of
fraud, the plaintiff does not allege that the fraud moved the stock price
upward; the more common allegation is that the fraud was used to conceal
internal problems. These kinds of frauds are designed to confirm existing
market expectations, and thus keep stock prices from falling;117 the fraud
causes no price movement for an event study to detect.118 The same
problem attaches when plaintiffs allege that the defendants disclosed
Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2415; see also Jill E. Fisch, The Future of Price Distortion in
Federal Securities Fraud Litigation, 10 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. P OL’Y 87 (2015).
113

See Andrew C. Baker, Note, Single-Firm Event Studies, Securities Fraud, and Financial Crisis:
Problems of Inference, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1207, 1209-10 (2016); Brav & Heaton, supra note
110, at 586; Fisch, supra note 113, at 96–98; Jill E. Fisch et al., The Logic and Limits of Event
Studies in Securities Fraud Litigation, 96 TEX. L. REV. 553, 556–57 (2018).
114
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Fisch, supra note 113, at 97–98.

116

Id. at 97.

FindWhat Inv’r Grp. v. FindWhat.com, 658 F.3d 1282, 1290–91 (11th Cir. 2011); see,
e.g. In re Vivendi, S.A. Sec. Litig., 838 F.3d 223, 232 (2d Cir. 2016).
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Merritt B. Fox, Halliburton II: It All Depends on What Defendants Need to Show to Establish
No Impact on Price, 70 BUS. LAW. 437, 441 (2015).
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problems but fraudulently minimized their scope;119 in such cases, the
effect of the fraud is to keep the stock price from falling as far as it would
have had the truth been known, and once again, there is nothing for an
event study to test.
Typically, then, defendants try to demonstrate a lack of market
movement when the truth is disclosed, akin to the analysis conducted in
the context of materiality. The argument is that if the market fails to
respond to a revelation of the truth, the original fraud is unlikely to have
moved prices either.120 Courts since Halliburton II have accepted this logic,
typically declaring that the presumption of price impact will be rebutted
if defendants demonstrate both that the market failed to respond to the
initial fraud, and that the market failed to respond to disclosure of the
truth.121 But even leaving aside the weaknesses in the mechanisms used to
detect such a price drop,122 the inquiry itself is orthogonal to the matter
ostensibly under consideration, namely, whether the fraud distorted
market prices initially. As the Supreme Court made clear, the lack of a
price drop upon disclosure of the truth does not, in fact, establish that
there was no price inflation to begin with. Intervening events may have
already deflated the stock to the point where the new information is no
longer relevant; information about the problems may leak out over time
in undetectable ways so that by the time the truth is disclosed, the market
has already anticipated and priced in that information.123 Even if
defendants prove the point, they will in many cases have established little
of relevance.
That said, there is almost certain to be a price drop somewhere,
because plaintiffs will not bring a case otherwise.124 Economic losses are
a necessary element of a Section 10(b) action, and after Dura, it is obvious
119

Schleicher v. Wendt, 618 F.3d 679, 682, 684 (7th Cir. 2010).

120

Fox, supra note 118, at 441.

See Burges v. Bancorpsouth, Inc., No. 3:14-cv-1564, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97953, at
*24 (M.D. Tenn. June 26, 2017); In re Virtus Inv. Partners, Inc., No. 15cv1249, 2017 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 73554, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. May 15, 2017); Willis v. Big Lots, Inc., 242 F. Supp.
3d 634, 656–57 (S.D. Ohio 2017); Marcus v. J.C. Penney Co., No. 6:13-cv-736-MHSKNM, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115795, at *23–24 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 29, 2016); City of
Sterling Heights Gen. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Prudential Fin., Inc., No. 12-5275, 2015 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 115287, at *31–32 (D.N.J. Aug. 31, 2015); Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v.
Halliburton Co., 309 F.R.D. 251, 257 (N.D. Tex. 2015).
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As discussed in the context of loss causation, these tests also incentivize defendants
to bundle any corrective disclosures with offsetting news; that way, the chances of any
detectable market movement upon disclosure of the truth are minimized. See supra Part
II.C.
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they must be at least plausibly connected to the underlying fraud. But even
if a price drop does occur, it may not shed any light on the question
whether the original statement impacted the market. This is because—as
described in the context of loss causation—many “disclosures” are not so
much revelations of an earlier fraud as negative business developments
that would be expected to cause a market price drop regardless of the
effect of any earlier lies.125 For example, in Ludlow v. BP, P.L.C., the
plaintiffs alleged that BP lied about the adequacy of the safety protocols
on its oil rigs, and that losses were incurred (and the truth was revealed)
when the Deepwater Horizon exploded—spewing 62,000 barrels of oil
per day into the ocean.126 Naturally, this disaster caused BP’s stock price
to plummet, but that fact hardly tells us anything about the impact of the
earlier misstatements.127
Cases like BP are commonplace,128 and thus many class
certification disputes do not turn on whether there was a market reaction
to a disclosure, but on whether disclosure itself was, in fact, corrective or
otherwise revealed the fraud.129 Frequently, the argument is paired with
the claim that the fraud was actually revealed at an earlier time than the
plaintiffs contend, and the lack of price movement in response to that
disclosure establishes that the original fraud did not move the price
either.130 But these inquiries are often indistinguishable from prohibited
inquiries into materiality and loss causation. As a result, many courts
either refuse to entertain them131 or work themselves into contortions to
Jill E. Fisch, The Trouble with Basic: Price Distortion after Halliburton, 90 WASH. U. L. REV.
895, 921 (2013); Lipton, supra note 50, at 79.
125

126

800 F.3d 674, 678 (5th Cir. 2015).

127

Lipton, supra note 50, at 79.

For example, in Halliburton itself, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants lied about
their exposure to tort liability and the truth was revealed when they lost their trials.
Halliburton Co., 309 F.R.D. at 255. Naturally, these negative events would be expected to
impact Halliburton’s price regardless of any earlier statements. Other cases might involve
regulatory enforcement actions, which again would unquestionably cause price drops
even if the original misstatements had no effect at all. See, e.g., City of Roseville Emps.’
Ret. Sys. v. Horizon Lines, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 2d 404, 408 (D. Del. 2009) (price drop upon
announcement of antitrust investigation).
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E.g., Thorpe v. Walter Inv. Mgmt. Corp., No. 1:14-cv-20880-UU, 2016 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 33637, at *44 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 16, 2016); Halliburton, 309 F.R.D. at 260.
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See, e.g., Marcus, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115795, at *24–25; Aranaz v. Catalyst Pharm.
Partners Inc., 302 F.R.D. 657, 671 (S.D. Fla. 2014).
130

Aranaz, 302 F.R.D. at 671 (truth-on-the-market is prohibited materiality inquiry);
Thorpe, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33637, at *44 (court is “unable to decouple” arguments
that disclosures did not correct prior misstatements “from a materiality inquiry”). But see
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distinguish the permissible from the impermissible.132 Moreover, given the
nature of truth-on-the-market arguments,133 they may be nearly as
impossible to parse in the class certification context as they are on the
motion to dismiss.
The transmogrification of arguments about the effect of the fraud
into arguments about the effect of corrective disclosures creates additional
confusion when the evidence is equivocal. A fraud may last for a
prolonged period, with numerous ostensible disclosures issued over
time.134 Courts may find that some, but not all, of these disclosures
impacted the stock’s price, and Halliburton II offers no guidance as to how
this evidence should be interpreted. Courts have, on occasion, reached
the remarkable conclusion that all who traded over a defined class period
should be certified as a class, excluding the mid-period dates when partial
disclosures had no effect.135 Such reasoning is facially incoherent:
disclosure dates are meant to provide evidence that the price was inflated
before that point—to certify a class while excluding specified days in the
middle is to suggest that somehow, the inflation spontaneously moved out
and then back into the stock unprompted.136

reaction to a prior disclosure are permissible at class certification); see also supra note 38
(discussing Ark. Teachers Ret. Sys.).
For example, on remand from the Supreme Court, the district court in Halliburton held
that evaluating the “corrective” nature of a disclosure would stray too far into forbidden
loss causation territory. 309 F.R.D. at 260–61. However, the court ultimately concluded
that two alleged disclosures were not corrective because they revealed no new
information to the market. Id. at 271–74. In West Virginia Pipe Trades Health & Welfare
Fund v. Medtronic, Inc., 325 F.R.D. 280, 293–94 (D. Minn. 2018), the court held that
prohibitions on assessing materiality and loss causation were no barrier to determining
whether a proposed end-of-class-period disclosure added new information to the market.
132
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See supra Part II.A.
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In re Am. Int’l Grp. Sec. Litig., 265 F.R.D. 157, 188 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Ann M. Lipton,
Halliburton and the Dog that Didn’t Bark, 10 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 20 n.72
(2015). AIG was decided prior to Halliburton II, but the court conducted a price impact
analysis similar to those conducted since.
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In another example of courts getting lost in the reasoning of corrective disclosures,
the court in In re Moody’s Corporation Securitites Litigation, 274 F.R.D. 480, 493
(S.D.N.Y. 2011), refused to certify a class because the plaintiffs identified corrective
disclosure dates, with associated market reactions, that occurred after the end of their
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In re American International Group Securities Litigation137 illustrates how
these highly stylized disputes can cause courts to miss the forest for the
trees. In that case, AIG was alleged to have committed a massive
accounting fraud combined with multiple illegal business transactions.
Disclosure of the truth trickled out over several months through reports
of federal and state investigations and, ultimately, a restatement of AIG’s
finances. Nonetheless, the court examined stock price movements on
each of the corrective disclosure dates to determine if defendants had
rebutted the presumption that AIG’s fraud had impacted the price of its
stock—a ludicrous question, given that AIG was a household name
trading on the New York Stock Exchange that had misstated its earnings
by nearly $4 billion over a multi-year class period.
The net result is that Halliburton II commands courts to make
findings similar to the merits-based determinations that already bedevil
them on motions to dismiss, only they are expected to do so with their
hands tied behind their backs. It perhaps unsurprising, then, that these
disputes stray into territory far removed from the actual matter under
consideration—namely, whether it is appropriate to try the case on a
classwide basis.
One might counter by pointing out that this is simply the class
certification motion; any error in plaintiffs’ favor, at least, can be revisited
at summary judgment or trial when a more fulsome record can be
considered.138 But that is too glib a response, because expectations for
how class certification motions will be litigated drive everything from
decisions about which cases will be filed to how they will be settled—and
perhaps even how defendants reveal negative information to the market
at the outset.139 And the denial of class certification may, in practical effect,
sound the death knell for the case as a whole.140 For that reason, the neararbitrary gauntlet that parties must run at the class certification stage
matters for the legitimacy of the entire enterprise.
To be sure, we can attempt some limited solutions.141 We can
clarify what types of evidence rebuts the presumption of price impact.
We can improve the use of event studies. We can alter burdens of proof
137

265 F.R.D. 157 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
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See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 351–52 n.6 (2011).
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See supra text accompanying notes 88-92.

This is particularly true given that, by the time class certification is denied, investors
may be time-barred from bringing individual claims. See Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. ANZ
Sec., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 2042, 2052 (2017).
140

I have previously questioned whether class certification should involve an assessment
of market efficiency or price impact at all. Lipton, supra note 135, at 21–25.
141

770

TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 20

so that, once the Basic presumptions attach, defendants only need meet a
burden of production before courts have flexibility to consider the
evidence holistically.142 But the problem is more deeply rooted: the limits
of what economists can prove, coupled with courts’ instinctive preference
for precedent over complexity, doom any changes from the outset.
IV.

DAMAGES

There are few modern judicial decisions on damages calculations
because securities class actions rarely proceed through trial. Nonetheless,
issues surrounding damages are significant because they inform how cases
are litigated and the amounts for which they settle,143 so I will briefly
discuss some of the challenges.
It is generally agreed that the proper measure of damages in a
fraud-on-the-market action is the amount by which the stock price was
inflated past its unmanipulated price, offset by any amounts the plaintiff
recouped by selling before the inflation fully dissipated.144 That simple
statement, however, hides a raft of complexity.
The unmanipulated price of the stock is typically identified by
looking to its market value after the full truth has been disclosed,
segmenting out any drops in value that are attributable to intervening
events.145 Plaintiffs then work backwards from that figure to identify the
stock’s unmanipulated value, and the amount of artificial inflation, at
various points throughout the class period, taking into account any
unrelated disclosures as well as any disclosures that bear upon the fraud
itself.146 Necessarily, these calculations depend heavily on event studies,
which—as described above—are plagued with inherent weaknesses.147
Beyond this limitation, however, lies the fact that the damages to
which plaintiffs are entitled—and methodologies for calculating them—
are still largely undefined. To begin, the final disclosures that cause
plaintiffs’ losses typically reveal not only the fact of the fraud, but also its
See Wendy Gerwick Couture, Answering Halliburton II’s Unanswered Question: Burdens of
Production and Persuasion on Price Impact at Class Certification, 43 SEC. REG. L.J. 167, 179
(2015). The Second Circuit rejected this proposal in Arkansas Teachers Retirement System v.
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., 879 F.3d 474, 485 (2018).
142

Baker, supra note 114, at 1224–25; Janet Cooper Alexander, The Value of Bad News in
Securities Class Actions, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1421, 1423–24 (1994).
143

Joseph A. Grundfest, Damages and Reliance Under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 69
BUS. LAW. 307, 364-65 (2014).
144

145

Lipton, supra note 30, at 119.
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various collateral consequences. The BP case described above illustrates
the problem: had the deficient safety protocols been immediately
disclosed, the company’s stock price would have reacted, but not nearly as
much as it plummeted in the wake of the Deepwater Horizon disaster.148
Similarly, a revelation of accounting fraud might be accompanied by
associated regulatory penalties that drive the stock price down further than
it would have gone if the company had simply confessed its true financial
condition prior to any fraudulent action.149 Disclosures of the
corporation’s true condition might also be accompanied by management
upheaval, civil lawsuits by affected parties—both securities related and
non—all of which contribute to the stock price drop that forms the basis
of the investors’ losses.
It is a matter of continuing controversy whether and to what
extent these additional damages should be collectible by plaintiffs,150 and
there may be few reliable methods of segmenting them out.151 Academics
have also debated whether the reputational hit that companies take as a
result of a fraud should or should not count towards Section 10(b)
damages,152 but if it does not, it presents another knotty—perhaps
impossible—evidentiary problem.
There are also likely to be a host of other kinds of confounding
factors that are nearly impossible to tease apart. Companies may make
projections of future performance that are of a piece with other
fraudulent statements but are protected by the safe harbor; they may issue
false statements that, judges conclude, were not made with scienter and
are thus inactionable. Attempts to distinguish among these statements
may be entirely speculative—especially given the poor standards that
govern in other phases of the action—and provide further reason to
doubt the entire enterprise of assessing the harm wrought by the fraud.

148
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149
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IS THERE A SOLUTION?

If the previous analysis is correct, judicial evaluations of market
impact are hopelessly muddled. The common law doctrines have diverged
so far from the underlying reality of how markets function as to border
on complete legal fiction. Parties joust over issues like puffery,
materialization of the risk, and definitions of market efficiency in a judicial
pantomime that barely pretends to assess the actual effects of fraud. As
a result, there is no assurance that the damages, if any, to which the
plaintiff may be legally entitled bear any resemblance to the actual harms
inflicted by the defendants.
It is not that these problems are novel; it has long been understood
that any judicial assessment of markets will necessarily offer only a rough
justice.153 Standards of greater or lesser stringency may not be attributable
to judicial misapprehension so much as a calculated preference as to where
to allocate the burden of uncertainty for an inquiry—the market effects
of a fraud—that is inherently uncertain.154 But if that is the motivation, it
is ill-served by current practice: courts’ “ham-fisted” mechanisms for
distinguishing meritorious cases from frivolous ones are likely to insulate
even “dastardly” frauds so long as defendants can manipulate their
disclosures sufficiently to match doctrinal rigidities.155
At this point, judicial evaluation of market evidence has become
so artificial that we may question the value of the private Section 10(b)
action at all, or fraud-on-the-market actions, or actions based on openmarket purchases. Over the years, reformers have offered various
permutations on proposals that these frauds be prosecuted largely or
exclusively by the government actors,156 arguing that public officials are
better positioned than private litigants to gauge when the benefits of
enforcement outweigh its costs. A full exploration of these arguments is
Langevoort, supra note 48, at 158 (noting the decision was more grounded in civil
procedure than economic theory).)
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beyond the scope of this Essay, but for present purposes suffice to say
that I continue to believe private enforcement plays an important role.
The SEC does not have—and is unlikely to have—sufficient resources to
police markets on its own,157 and, as James Park has explained, public and
private enforcers may focus on different types of rule-breaking and thus
together cover a fuller spectrum of misconduct.158 I also believe that the
private class action today plays an expressive role, in that it is a visible
mechanism for public accountability of large corporations to those who
they have injured.159
At the same time, it has long been recognized that securities class
actions minimally, if at all, compensate defrauded investors; their chief
value lies in their capacity to deter misconduct and thus inspire confidence
in securities markets generally.160 But to be effective and appropriate for
that purpose, there must be a rational relationship between the
wrongfulness of the misconduct, the size of the harm, and the penalty
imposed. Given the cavernous distance between judicial measures of
harm and the underlying reality, that relationship is currently absent.161
Therefore, I believe that courts should be relieved from the burden of
assessing market evidence or—as much as possible—determining the
hypothetical significance of corporate information to investors.
How might this be achieved? To begin, it seems that either the
reliance element of a Section 10(b) action, or the materiality element might
be eliminated, but not both. As I have explained elsewhere, securities
fraud actions are often predicated on vague or boilerplate misstatements
that bear only a glancing relationship to the underlying conduct that
actually caused the investors’ losses; these actions seem more like claims
about corporate governance than fraud, and, at least given our current
division of labor between state and federal law, are not viewed as the
proper subject of a Section 10(b) action.162 Thus, there must be some
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screening mechanism available to courts to gauge whether the
misstatement was, in fact, likely to have deceived investors.
That said, one could easily imagine eliminating the reliance
requirement entirely, and leaving courts only to assess materiality. We
currently do this for claims brought under Sections 11 of the Securities
Act,163 which prohibits misleading registration statements on the
assumption that these documents necessarily influence the trading price
of the relevant security.164 We might adopt a similar assumption for all
public statements made about a publicly traded—or even just exchange
traded—stock. To avoid the necessity of calculating loss causation or
damages, we might simply impose statutory fines paid to all investors who
experience an economic loss during the fraud period. This system is far
from perfect: courts would still be required to gauge what would be
important to a hypothetical investor, which would continue to create
opportunities for judicial mischief, and investors might be
overcompensated to the extent they are paid for losses unrelated to the
fraudulent conduct.165 Still, market evidence would presumably play less
of a role, and fines could be calibrated based on a legislative assessment
of harm—perhaps tied to the size of the fraud relative to the issuer’s
business rather than to market reaction, with a view toward deterring
future misbehavior. And by redefining the cause of action in this manner,
it could be expanded to securities where the demands of “market
efficiency” have previously acted as an insurmountable barrier to class
litigation. Indeed, it is precisely these markets, often thinly traded with
little analyst attention, that may be most vulnerable to fraud. Moreover,
to the extent some of the judicial decisionmaking in this area springs from
a perceived need to fill gaps left by Congress, a more precise legislative
articulation of appropriate penalties would alleviate these concerns.
Alternatively, as I have suggested elsewhere, we might focus on
reliance.166 Instead of presuming price impact, we could grant a remedy
to those investors who show that the misstatement factored, even
minimally, into their investment decision or algorithm, without the need
for judicial evaluation of materiality. This relatively light burden might be
scienter to remain silent about behavior that is not, per se, the subject of the securities
laws. Lipton, supra note 50, at 74–75.
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enough to weed out claims based on every jot and tittle, while still being
practical for plaintiffs to pursue. Nor would it necessarily exclude all
“passive” investors; many ostensibly indexed funds in fact create their own
indices (or use ones created by affiliates) that rely on idiosyncratic
criteria;167 occasionally the inclusion or weighting of a particular security
may be influenced by fraudulent statements. To be sure, these cases could
not be brought as class actions (though perhaps they could be certified as
issue classes under Rule 23(c)), but they might still be feasible if statutory
damage awards are large enough.
But if remedies are available only to those traders who establish
reliance (however much their burden is eased), huge swaths of investors
will be unable to recover at all.168 These investors might experience their
exclusion as injustice, even if (or perhaps especially if) statutory awards to
the remaining investors are set at a high enough level to deter future
misconduct. To prevent the disparity from diminishing the expressive
value of a Section 10(b) action, the best solution may be a hybrid system,
whereby investors who establish reliance receive a larger award—perhaps
treble the ordinary statutory figure—and investors who rely only on the
materiality of the misstatement receive a lesser amount. That way, in
appropriate cases, investors who can prove reliance could join with larger
class actions and share some of the expenses.169
VI.

CONCLUSION

Securities class actions have attracted hostility from judges,
politicians, and commenters for decades; that hostility, surely, has
contributed to the development of doctrines that narrow the scope of
permissible claims and contribute to the action’s complexity. Matters are
not helped by the PSLRA, which —by barring discovery in the early stages
of litigation while imposing heightened pleading requirements170—frontloads securities actions and forces courts to make complex judgments on
very limited records.
Still, the problems identified in this Essay have much deeper roots
and call into question the very capacity of courts to make the
determinations that securities class actions demand of them. Certainly, in
any litigation, there is a risk of error, and courts will always need to make
difficult factual judgments under conditions of uncertainty. But
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policymakers must also determine when the cost of efforts to ensure
accuracy outweigh their benefits. It is time to recognize that as currently
constituted, procedures associated with fraud-on-the-market actions
barely aspire to accuracy, and the costs associated with improving them
are likely to far exceed their incremental value. A redefinition of the cause
of action, with damages expressly calibrated to advance its goals, would
ultimately be of more benefit to litigants, courts, and markets.

